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Look at a map and what you see is a world divided into nation-states. Yet these lines 
do not always tell the whole story. In fact, hidden beneath the arbitrary masses of  
land on maps is a history of  imperialism and resistance. Whether the colonizer or 
colonized, nationalism is a fundamental part of  this story. Each of  the books under 
review highlight how various actors on the world stage understood and reconfigured 
nationalism to achieve their particular goals at home and abroad. 
Daniel Immerwahr joins the longstanding debate among historians over 
whether the United States deserves the appellation of  imperialist. Yet, Immerwahr’s 
entrance into the feud is refreshing due to his ability to employ old evidence in new 
ways. To defend his argument that the United States is and always has been an em-
pire, Immerwahr, in his fantastic How to Hide an Empire: A History of  the Greater 
United States, targets what he calls the “logo map,” a term he borrowed from Bene-
dict Anderson, which is the accepted image of  the United States that appears on 
maps. Immerwahr takes issue with the “logo map” because it distorts US history. 
The most visible distortion is the inconspicuous absence of  Alaska and Hawaii. 
Also missing is Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the countless other 
smaller islands. As an alternative, Immerwahr proposes a map more representative 
of  what he calls the “Greater United States.” To ignore the parts that make up the 
Greater United States is to downplay the reality of  US empire. By the 1940s, these 
additional lands included a population of  nearly 19 million people. In terms of  land, 
almost a fifth of  the Greater United States existed outside of  the contiguous United 
States. Though nowhere near the geographic scope of  the British Empire, Immer-
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wahr points out that “the United States’ empire was nonetheless sizable.1 
Immerwahr tells his story in “three acts,” beginning with white settlers 
taking the lands occupied by North American Indians, followed by the annexation 
of  overseas territory, and concluding his story with a series of  seeming reversals 
that involved the United States relinquishing its territories in the aftermath of  World 
War II. While not downplaying US westward expansion, Immerwahr’s story picks 
up steam in the second act with a captivating account of  how a desire for bat guano 
spurred US imperialism. With the Guano Islands Act of  1856, nearly one hundred 
islands came under the control of  the United States. The legislation allowed US citi-
zens to search for islands in the Pacific and Caribbean with ample bat droppings 
and declare them part of  the United States. After some initial reluctance to pass 
the measure in Congress, proponents of  the bill convinced the skeptics that since 
the islands would not support habitation, the law did not give official support to 
colonialism. Yet, these arguments proved premature, as the Supreme Court heard 
a case centred on workers’ action against the Navassa Phosphate Company. Though 
no government existed on these islands, the Supreme Court ruled that US laws ex-
tended to these isolated dots of  land in the middle of  the ocean. President Benjamin 
Harrison seemed to back the Supreme Court decision when he sent the USS Kearsage 
to check conditions on the island and later proclaimed during his annual message 
to Congress that corporations operating on these lands were under the jurisdiction 
of  the US government and laws. In essence, the legislation, the Supreme Court de-
cision, and Harrison’s unequivocal defense of  the ruling meant that America’s bor-
ders now extended beyond the North American continent. Such logic would 
eventually lead to the building of  airfields on tiny islands across the Pacific. 
At the same time, the invisibility of  US empire on the “logo map” con-
formed with the growing hesitancy to extend US laws to its territorial possessions. 
When the United States won the Spanish-American war, Immerwahr suggests the 
newly acquired lands posed a “trilemma.” He writes, “republicanism, white sup-
remacy, and overseas expansion—the country could have at most two.”2 The prob-
lem stemmed from the fact that these new lands, unlike previous territory, had a 
large non-white population. Given the difficulties involved with restraining expan-
sion, either republicanism or white supremacy had to go. The former would mean 
denying the peoples of  these lands the same rights as Americans, while the latter 
involved granting Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other territories statehood down 
the road. In the Insular Cases of  the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
distinguished between territories, which existed as part of  the union and therefore 
came under the protection of  the Constitution, and the “unincorporated” lands 
outside of  the United States, such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, which did 
not have the same protections. In fact, the “logo map” became popular within a 
decade of  the end of  the Spanish-American war. By 1910, the imperial maneuvers 
of  the United States, once celebrated, became viewed by some Americans as, in the 
words of  Immerwahr, “a regrettable drunken binge.”3 As the likelihood of  US in-
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volvement in World War I increased, so too did nationalism, but US citizens recon-
strued the nation as being only those 48 states in North America, not as earlier 
maps of  the “Greater United States” had, with insets of  the United States’ various 
territorial possessions. 
Events following World War II seemed to portend an end to American 
empire, but Immerwahr urges caution in seeing this era as a break from earlier 
epochs and notes the increasingly prominent structure of  informal imperialism. 
The United States finally allowed the Philippines its independence and bestowed 
“commonwealth” status upon Puerto Rico. Meanwhile, Alaska and Hawaii achieved 
statehood. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism likely played a part, but so too did 
technology. To begin with, many products no longer required the resources found 
in foreign lands. Nor did the United States have to annex new lands when advances 
in transportation, communication, and other areas allowed the same benefits. More-
over, standardization of  everything from language to signage to hardware, notably 
screws, made physical control of  these lands unnecessary. Globalization of  this sort 
did not occur on its own, but rather through the purposeful actions of  the US mil-
itary, with the intent of  creating a less controversial alternative to colonialism. A 
“mastery of  logistics,” Immerwahr argues, allowed the United States to avoid having 
to claim physical possession of  colonies, at least in their entirety.4 Instead, the United 
States would use its capabilities in building infrastructure to create new ports, 
airstrips, storage depots, and other structures marking a US presence. According to 
Immerwahr, synthetics “remade geopolitics.”5 No longer did the United States have 
to worry about access to resources, which in the past had led to control over foreign 
lands and conflict. Even oil shortages never reached the level that would lead to a 
possible invasion by the United States of  the Middle East. The bases that remained 
after World War II accounted for a total area less than the state of  Connecticut. 
And while the Greater United States had a population in which 51 percent, due 
largely to postwar US occupations of  Japan and elsewhere, lived outside of  the con-
tinental United States, that number declined substantially, reaching only two percent 
in 1960. 
Combined with the logistical advances that allowed the United States to 
reach virtually any locale on the globe through air travel, territory lost its luster. 
Joseph Stalin learned this lesson in 1948 when he prevented US access to Berlin. In 
response, the US military initiated the successful airlift. As the “arsenal of  democ-
racy” during World War II, the United States could also demand that standardization 
of  everything from aircraft parts to screws conform to US specifications. The cre-
ation of  NATO expanded US dominance into peacetime as US allies agreed to 
change their guns and aircraft to match those preferred by the United States. While 
large swaths of  land no longer mattered, the United States came to rely more heavily 
on its earliest possessions, tiny islands. Already in the 1930s, under the direction of  
Ernest Gruening, the United States attempted to reclaim control over these terri-
tories, which “acquired special importance in the twilight of  formal empire.”6 These 
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pieces of  land proved far easier to control in the post-World War II moment when 
decolonization pressures made maintaining an empire difficult. Even in the Philip-
pines, which had gained independence in 1946, the United States demanded military 
bases. A similar process occurred across US possessions. Immerwahr has called this 
system of  worldwide bases “Baselandia.” US bases brought with them many ben-
efits, nearly all of  them financial, but it also created tension, as exemplified by the 
protests carried out by the bases’ neighbours in Japan. Moreover, the United States 
unwittingly helped grow Japan’s economy, which would have important ramifica-
tions for US industry in future decades. Immerwahr describes this as America’s 
“pointillist empire” because US territories represented nothing more than a point 
on the map. Though small, these bases caused much anger, which usually led to 
protests, but other times much worse. After all, Immerwahr reminds us that “Sep-
tember 11 was, in large part, retaliation against the United States for its empire of  
bases.”7 
Besides helping to shed light on America’s hidden empire, Immerwahr’s 
book also illustrates the precarious nature of  decolonization and territorial inde-
pendence. Despite the successful anti-colonial movement waged by Third World 
nations across the globe in the aftermath of  World War II, independence remained 
elusive. As Adom Getachew shows in her excellent study, Worldmaking After Empire: 
The Rise and Fall of  Self-Determination, true self-determination hinged on the trans-
formation of  the entire global order. Getachew details how, for many Third World 
leaders involved in the decolonization movement, their interests extended beyond 
the nation-state. Getachew rejects the notion that nationalism was “parochial and 
anti-universal.”8 People like Michael Manley of  Jamaica and Julius Nyerere of  Tan-
zania realized that self-determination required more than breaking free from the 
shackles of  colonialism. True independence would come only with the “reordering” 
of  the global order in the legal, political, and economic realms. Thus, these individ-
uals went far beyond rebuilding their own societies to “worldmaking.”9 As another 
leader in the anti-colonial movement, Kwame Nkrumah of  Ghana, understood, be-
coming a nation-state and becoming a part of  the international community of  na-
tions represented only the first step in true independence since dependency 
inevitably followed in the footsteps of  decolonization. Thus “unequal integration,” 
as Getachew calls it, ensured that recently decolonized nations would remain in an 
inferior position as they had to meet all the “obligations” of  membership in the in-
ternational society, but received only some of  the “rights” given to other European 
countries.10 Together, Immerwahr’s and Getachew’s books do a tremendous job of  
illustrating how empires remained in spite of  the efforts of  the decolonization 
movement. 
The inequality among states decried by Nkrumah had roots in earlier ef-
forts to rid the world of  empire. The “racialized international hierarchy” discussed 
by Getachew appeared in the League of  Nations, as evidenced by the experiences 
of  league members Ethiopia and Liberia.11 These nations, along with self-governing 
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British dominions like India and smaller states in Eastern Europe, had to exist in a 
sort of  purgatory, neither a colony, but not yet a state with all the privileges accorded 
to such entities. In the case of  Ethiopia, the league used inclusion in the interna-
tional body to gain authority to solve Ethiopia’s slave labour problem and thus act 
as a benevolent overseer directing the begotten nation in the proper direction toward 
civilization. Consequently, Ethiopia was a mandate of  the league in all but name. 
Liberia faced a similar existence in the league. While investigating the use of  slave 
labour in Ethiopia and Liberia, the league looked at the countries in isolation, ig-
noring how a regional economic system enmeshed in colonialism created these con-
ditions. Rather than looking externally, the league focused on internal problems, 
mainly leadership by blacks. As such, Ethiopia and Liberia had to go above and be-
yond what was expected of  other league members to stay within the organization. 
For Ethiopia, its existence on the fringe of  the league had significant ramifications. 
Italy, which would invade Ethiopia in 1935, defended its actions by pointing to the 
nation’s purported inability to govern itself  and its lack of  success towards becom-
ing civilized, the same arguments previously employed by the league. Moreover, 
Italy construed its invasion as being no different from earlier league attempts to 
transform Ethiopia. 
Adoption in 1960 of  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, 
known as Declaration on the Granting of  Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, was a major victory for the decolonization movement. At the same time, 
it also represented a retrenchment in the sense that by couching self-determination 
in terms of  human rights, which proved most amenable to other members of  the 
General Assembly, the resolution had to discard its economic demands, particularly 
relating to sovereign control over natural resources. Yet, from the perspective of  
the anti-colonial nationalists, the collective right of  self-determination, which would 
free nations from imperial control, made possible the protection of  individual 
human rights. In other words, with democratic self-government now a reality fol-
lowing the passage of  resolution 1514, protection of  individual human rights would 
follow naturally. 
In reality, however, the link between human rights and self-determination 
posed a threat to post-colonial independence. The ethnic conflict that ravaged Nige-
ria between 1967 and 1970 led to growing doubts about self-determination. During 
this time, the Igbo people sought to secede from Nigeria and form their own state, 
Biafra. In response, the Organization of  African Unity (OAU) offered assistance, 
but only to mediate between the two sides. The OAU did not consider the Igbo’s 
pleas for self-determination as valid. The leader of  Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, dis-
agreed with the OAU’s approach. He not only argued that the Biafrans deserved 
their own separate nation due to Nigeria’s borders being based on old colonial de-
signs, but he also linked the abuses against the Igbo to human rights violations. Un-
like Nyerere, who continued to speak in the language of  self-determination, 
international human rights organizations, notably Doctors Without Borders, focused 
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on the individuals harmed by the post-colonial governments, which fed into the 
growing chorus of  voices linking the rise of  self-determination to greater levels of  
human rights abuses. Such thinking would lead to increasing numbers of  humani-
tarian interventions in the Third World. 
As anti-colonial leaders faced a series of  hurdles in their quest for national 
independence and self-determination, various Third World voices put forth blue-
prints for a new world order. In fact, one of  the most significant contributions of  
Getachew’s study is an analysis of  these various plans. To show the strain of  think-
ing present in the Third World that placed national independence in a place of  sec-
ondary importance, Getachew looks at Ghana’s leader, Kwame Nkrumah, who 
popularized the notion of  neocolonialism. Nkrumah, borrowing from Lenin’s idea 
of  neocolonialism, understood the limits placed on national sovereignty by the con-
tinued economic domination of  former colonies by imperial powers. Thus, 
Nkrumah included in Ghana’s constitution a clause that would allow the nation to 
give up some of  its sovereign rights to join a Union of  African States. From his 
perspective, federation would allow the young nations to become more economically 
self-reliant through involvement in a regional economy separate from both the 
United States and the European Economic Community. Though regional in focus, 
federation would have important ramifications for the position of  post-colonial na-
tions in the international realm as well. After recognizing the economic benefits of  
federation, participating nations would look for ways to use their newfound strength 
to thwart foreign political and military interference in their internal affairs and gain 
more power in international bodies like the UN. 
For inspiration Nkrumah, along with Eric Williams, a professor at Howard 
University in the United States involved with the West Indian Federation, looked 
to America in 1776. Yet, rather than celebrate America’s independence, Nkrumah 
and Williams pointed to the nation’s continued economic dependence on imperial 
Britain, which retained a hold on America until the thirteen states federated in 1787. 
Nkrumah and Williams also found favour with federalism because it allowed for a 
strong centralized government. While critics worried that such a structure would 
transpose hierarchy to the regional level, Nkrumah and Williams claimed that avoid-
ing foreign domination required centralization. Not surprisingly, not all Third World 
leaders supported federalism. Michael Manley of  Jamaica stood as a staunch critic 
of  a strong federal state as proposed for the West Indian Federation. Manly wanted 
to limit the central government’s authority to diplomatic and defense issues and 
leave economic matters to individual countries.  
The internationalism of  the anti-colonial nationalists was most evident in 
the construction and promotion of  a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
by the Global South. The consequences of  colonialism extended into the post-colo-
nial world, which meant that overcoming unequal economic development required 
a new global economic system. Though much has been written about the NIEO, 
Getachew sheds new light on the topic by showing how, through their promotion 
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of  self-reliance, Manley and Nyerere had more in mind with the NIEO than simply 
strengthening national sovereignty. Thus, “overcoming dependence was to be real-
ized domestically through socialist policies and internationally in the New Interna-
tional Economic Order,” Getachew writes.12 In other words, Nyerere and Manley 
hoped to decolonize both the internal economies of  Third World nations and the 
global economy. Moreover, Getachew looks beyond the NIEO’s demand for a mas-
sive redistribution of  wealth from North to South and illustrates how postcolonial 
leaders sought to place the global economy under the control of  a truly represen-
tative international body like the United Nations General Assembly. 
For various reasons, the United States retained its empire in spite of  the 
efforts of  critics like Nkrumah and Manley. Economics surely played a role in this, 
but so too did America’s massive nuclear arsenal, which allowed the United States 
to maintain its hegemony over the capitalist world. Yet, during the post-Vietnam 
War era, all things nuclear came under fire from an unlikely constituency within the 
United States: white, working-class conservatives. This story is told in Natasha 
Zaretsky’s Radiation Nation: Three Mile Island and the Political Transformation of  the 1970s. 
Zaretsky calls for a greater recognition of  the growth of  “biotic nationalism” in 
the 1970s. Especially pronounced among conservatives, these aggrieved citizens 
borrowed from dissidents of  the 1960s as they felt like the government sacrificed 
their bodies in pursuit of  global supremacy during the Cold War.13 Thus, the antiwar, 
ecological, civil rights, and women’s movements of  the 1960s inspired the “patriotic 
Americans” response to the Three Mile Island disaster that helped transform con-
servatism. Following the disaster, conservative residents of  the Susquehanna River 
Valley exhibited “a new post-Vietnam interrogation of  authority” and became awak-
ened to the ecological threat to their bodies. Combined, these concerns led to what 
Zaretsky has called “a post-Vietnam patriotic body politics” among these conser-
vatives.14 
The focus on body politics placed women at the centre of  the story. 
Whereas in the past male soldiers returned home from battle and castigated the 
government for its failure to care for wounded veterans, the Three Mile Island fiasco 
transferred “patriotic body politics” to women, “from the martial arena to the fam-
ilial one,” in the words of  Zaretsky.15 A similar transference occurred in the realm 
of  psychology. Residents of  central Pennsylvania began to compare their psycho-
logical distress as a form of  post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which up until 
that point had usually inflicted soldiers returning from Vietnam. Others also referred 
to themselves as POWs unable to escape radiation. In the minds of  these conser-
vatives, the government failed to protect its own citizens from its nuclear power. A 
“culture of  dissociation,” in which weapons of  mass destruction, nuclear and oth-
erwise, protected US citizens from foreign enemies but also threatened their own 
existence, allowed the United States to amass a massive defensive posture.16 The 
accident at Three Mile Island, even more than 1950s and 1960s protests against the 
testing of  atomic weapons, helped deconstruct the “culture of  dissociation” created 
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by the US government. 
Yet, rather than use their newfound cynicism of  the US government to 
criticize US foreign policy more generally, these activists remained avowed nation-
alists, evincing no concern for the world beyond the United States. Unlike the an-
tiwar protestors, “radiation activists,” as Zaretsky has called those Americans seeking 
redress for being exposed to nuclear fallout, voiced concern over their own “vic-
timization,” which they compared to the decline of  the nation as a whole. Thus, 
they sought, in the words of  Zaretsky, “the restoration of  a lost patriotism and the 
reconstitution of  national power.” These “reluctant activists,” moreover, claimed 
that unlike leftists protesting the US empire or promoting Earth Day out of  a sup-
posed moral duty, they did so out of  concern for their own survival.17 
This tendency also found expression in the burgeoning anti-nuclear move-
ment of  the late 1970s and 1980s. Despite the opposition to nuclear war by freeze 
activists, the movement remained committed to “a biotic, body-centered national-
ism” imbued with a patriotism concerned only with the survival of  America and its 
people. Zaretsky has pointed to a “temporal emphasis on futurity” predominant 
among freeze supporters that led to them focusing almost entirely on a future out-
break of  nuclear war while ignoring how conventional weapons used in present 
conflicts caused much death and destruction.18 This outlook also tended to prioritize 
the likely American lives lost during a nuclear exchange over those persons killed in 
faraway lands. Such a strategy, however, allowed the freeze activists to avoid any 
linkage to more radical opponents of  US foreign policy that sought to criticize US 
imperialism. By actively instructing its members to avoid any mention of  Vietnam, 
freeze leaders “deployed a conscious strategy of  depolarization,” according to Zaret-
sky.19 Consequently, in the midst of  this massive campaign to stop the nuclear arms 
race in its track, the United States continued to intervene in lands near and far in 
pursuit of  global supremacy. 
Taken together, these books shed light on the prevalence and power of  
empire and illustrate why, even in the aftermath of  the US failure in Vietnam, Amer-
icans refused to change course in terms of  foreign policy. In showing how much 
territory the United States physically controlled in the past, and present for that 
matter, Immerwahr lays bare for all to see the empire created by the United States. 
At the same time, by transitioning the lens to the Third World, Getachew illustrates 
how other forms of  control, both economic and political, thwarted efforts for self-
determination and ensured the continuation of  empire. In short, these two books 
prove that empires applied their power in direct and indirect ways to maintain a hi-
erarchy of  nation-states. The post-Vietnam era offered perhaps the best opportunity 
for the United States to dismantle its empire, both physical and otherwise, but other 
concerns proved more pressing for Americans. Like radiation, US empire is not al-
ways visible, but in the 1970s and 1980s, that did not stop Americans from targeting 
the former while ignoring the latter. Zaretsky’s success in linking the protests at 
Three Mile Island to the transformation of  nationalism does much to further our 
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understanding of  why the United States did not change course in the global arena 
following the Vietnam War. 
Maps produced today look far different from those of  even just twenty-
five or thirty years ago. Yet, despite these changes to the world’s nations and borders, 
much remains the same. The United States is still the dominant player in the political 
and economic realm. Though radical ideas radiated outward from the antiwar, civil 
rights, feminist, and ecological movements of  the 1960s to the conservative resi-
dents of  the Susquehanna River Valley following the Three Mile Island accident in 
the 1970s, this critical gaze did not extend to US activities abroad. Meanwhile, the 
post-colonial vision offered by the Third World could not withstand the onslaught 
of  neoliberalism. As a result, the Global South continues to struggle to get out from 
under the weight of  an unequal global capitalist system. And while the inclusion of  
ecological concerns into the nationalism of  the Three Mile Island victims helped 
distinguish it from earlier forms of  nationalism, such a worldview is ill-suited in the 
contemporary era. After all, the current ecological threat, climate change, ignores 
territorial boundaries, meaning that a different, more internationalist approach is 
necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review Essay 103
NOTES 
 
1 Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of  the Greater United States 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019), 11.
2 Immerwahr, 80.
3 Immerwahr, 110.
4 Immerwahr, 216.
5 Immerwahr, 274.
6 Immerwahr, 343.
7 Immerwahr, 382.
8 Adom Getachew, Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of  Self-Determination 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 3. 
9 Getachew, 2.
10 Getachew, 17–18.
11 Getachew, 40.
12 Getachew, 154.
13 Natasha Zaretsky, Radiation Nation: Three Mile Island and the Political Transformation 
of  the 1970s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), xvi.
14 Zaretsky, 9.
15 Zaretsky, 95.
16 Zaretsky, 15.
17 Zaretsky, 55–56.
18 Zaretsky, 171.
19 Zaretsky, 173.
